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Date
2024-03-25Type
- Conference Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing dynamic mechanisms for welfare is relatively well understood. However, there has been less work on optimizing for other goals (e.g. revenue), and without restrictive assumptions on valuations, it is remarkably challenging to characterize good mechanisms. Instead, we turn to automated mechanism design to find mechanisms with good performance in specific problem instances. We extend the class of affine maximizer mechanisms to MDPs where agents may untruthfully report their rewards. This extension results in a challenging bilevel optimization problem in which the upper problem involves choosing optimal mechanism parameters, and the lower problem involves solving the resulting MDP. Our approach can find truthful dynamic mechanisms that achieve strong performance on goals other than welfare, and can be applied to essentially any problem setting-without restrictions on valuations-for which RL can learn optimal policies. Show more
Publication status
publishedExternal links
Book title
Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceVolume
Pages / Article No.
Publisher
AAAIEvent
Subject
GTEP: Mechanism Design; GTEP: Auctions and Market-Based SystemsOrganisational unit
02219 - ETH AI Center / ETH AI Center09729 - He, Niao / He, Niao
Funding
207343 - RING: Robust Intelligence with Nonconvex Games (SNF)
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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