Managerial incentives for risk mitigation and the morderation of credit cycles from a macroprudential perspective
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Author
Date
2014Type
- Doctoral Thesis
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010349761Publication status
publishedExternal links
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Publisher
ETH-ZürichSubject
BANKEN + BANKWESEN; PRINZIPAL-AGENT-THEORIE (SPIELTHEORIE); BANKS + BANKING; PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY (GAME THEORY); FINANZRISIKO (FINANZEN); FINANCIAL RISK (FINANCE)Organisational unit
02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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